George Popp v. Arie Peter Roth and Gerarda Roth : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1959
George Popp v. Arie Peter Roth and Gerarda Roth :
Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Owen & Ward; Counsel for the Defendants and Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Popp v. Roth, No. 8956 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3205
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE. POPP, 
ARIE PETER ROTH and ) 
GERARDA ROTH, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents.' 
1 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
OWEN &WARD 
( ;. 
.. " 
. ., 
1., 
Counsel for the Defendants -
1 
':.. !; · 
and Respondents, 
141 East Second South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT -------------------------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------------ 2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ---------------------------------------------------- 7 
ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 
I The minor child involved herein is illegitimate____ 7 
II There has never been a legitimation of the child 
because there never was a valid marriage________ _____ 8 
III Defendants have complied with the statutory 
requirements for the adoption of an illegitimate 
child ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23 
IV Plaintiff is not the natural father of the child _____ 23 
V Plaintiff is not a fit and proper person to have 
custody of the child __________________________________________________ 25 
VI The best interest and welfare of the child require 
that the defendants retain custody of the child____ 27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
---------- --------~-·----~~·-·····- -- --
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Page 
Anderson vs. Anderson, 121 Utah 237, 240 P. 2d 966 ................................ 15 
Baldwin vs. Nielson, 174 P. 2d 437 ................................................................ 28 
Bauer vs. Abrahams, 73 Colo. 509, 216 P. 259 ... -------------------------------------- 18 
Briggs vs. Briggs, 181 P. 2d 223 ...... --------------------------------------·-------················ 28 
In re Floods Estate, 21,. P. 2d 579, 217 Calif. 763 ... -................................... 8 
Heflinger vs. Heflinger, 136 Va., 289, 118 SE 316 .................... -----------13, 14 
Hendrichs vs. Anderson, 191 F. 2d 242 ..................... _ ................................. 15, 21 
Johnson vs. Johnson, 207 P. 2d, 1036 ....... - ................. _;~.------------············------- 15 
Kurtz vs. Christensen, 209 P. 340, 61 Utah L-~---------------------------------------- 27 
Miller vs. Pennington, 218 Ill., 220, 73 NE 919 ...... ·-···········-----------·-········- 9 
Olmsted vs. Olmsted, 190 N.Y. 458, 83 NE 569 .......... ·-··········---·-············ 10 
Sanders vs. Industrial Commission, 64 Utah 372, 230 P. 1026 ................ 15 
State vs. Hammond, 46 Utah 249, 148 P. 420 ........... ·---------------------------------- 25 
Stevens vs. Stevens, 304 Ill., 297, 136 NE 785 ......... ·--------------------------------- 15 
Walton vs. Coffman, 169 P. 2d 97 .............................................................. 27, 28 
TEXTS CITED 
7 Am. Jur., Bastards, Sec. 58, p. 666----------------·-·····-·········;·------·-----················ 10 
17 Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation, Sec. 474, p. 579 ....... -------------------- 14 
17 (a) Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation, Sec. 959, p. 141.. .................... 20 
Annotation, 32 A.L.R. 1088 ............................................................................ 13 
Annotation, 32 A.L.R. 1125 ···-····c·································-··············-··············· 13 
Annotation, 51, .A.L:R. 325 ····-----------------·································-------------······ 17 
10 C.J.S., Bastards, Sec. 11 (b) p. 59 ·······-··················-··········-··················· 9 
10 C.J.S., Bastards, Sec. 12, p. 68 --------------···················································· 10 
27 C.J.S., Divorce, Sec. 182,-(a) p. 841.. ..........•..... ..;.:;. ................... ----------------- 21 
Goodrich on Conflicts of Law, Hornbook Series, 2d Ed. p. 307, 308 ........ 14 
The Restatement of the Laws of Conflicts, Sec. 130, p. 194 
·: Comment (a)· ····················"···········-~-----------------------------•------------------------------ 17 
216 U.S. 386, 54 L. Ed, 530,. 30 S. Ct. 292 .... ~----··---------·-..,.------·--------------------- 11 
Vol. I, Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 133--------------~----------~------~------~-------------------· 24 
Vol. VII, Wigmore :on Evidence, Sec. 2063, 3d Ed; ................ : ................... 24 J 
. STATUTES t:rttD; ' :d ;'} ; . · 0. 
Chapter 3, Sec.tiol.l J63, Illi~oi~ .Annotat~d Statutes.................................... 8 
Chapter 89~ Section 17a, Il)i~ois Annotated· Statutes .................................. 22 
Chapter 89, S~ction· 19, 'Hlinois 'Annotated ·Statutes; ....... .;. .......................... 16 
C_. h11pter 30, Title.- 78, J.Itah- .<;ode Annota~~, .. 1953--,-----···:·--",---------------------- 23 
' •' I .• .... ! ,• . •' • • . ~... ........ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IH THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE POPP, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ARIE PETER ROTH and 
GERARDA ROTH, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8956 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In accordance with appellant's brief, the appel-
lant, George Popp, will be referred to herein as plain-
tiff, and the respondents, Arie Peter Roth and Ger-
arda Roth, will be referred to as defendants. 
In plaintiff's habeas corpus proceedings the 
Court determined that the custody· of ·the female 
minor child by the defendants was legal and should 
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remain with the defendants and that the plaintiff 
had no right to custody. In so ordering, the Court 
found: (R. 190) 
( 1 ) That the defendants have legal custody 
pursuant to an order of Court made and entered in 
connection with a proceeding for the adoption of an 
illegitimate minor child. 
(2) That the child is illegitimate. 
( 3) That the plaintiff is not the natural father 
of the child. 
(4) That the plaintiff is not a fit and proper 
person to have custody of the child. 
( 5) That the best interests and welfare of the 
minor child require that she remain in the custody 
of the defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants agree essentially \Yith the facts 
stated in appellant's brief as far as they go, but a 
more complete statement of facts is required for an 
understanding of the action of the Court below. 
It is undisputed that the child involved herein 
was illegitimate at the time of its birth. Further~ the 
plaintiff does not dispute that defendants have com-
plied with the provisions of Chapter 30, Title 7 8, 
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U.C.A., 1953 pertaining to the adoption of an illegiti-
mate child. 
Plaintiff is thirty-four years of age CR. 64). The 
natural mother of the child, Winifred Fleischmann, 
is twenty-one years of age CR. 64). Both came to the 
United States from West Germany but at separate 
times. The plaintiff came in July, 1955 CR. 44). 
Winifred came February 1, 1955 with her mother 
and sister CR. 100). Plaintiff has known Winifred 
ever since she was a young child of ten years CR. 40) 
and claims to have had illicit relations with her in 
Germany when she was seventeen years of age CR. 43, 
64) and that the child involved herein is the issue of 
such relations CR. 46). 
During this time, plaintiff was married to an-
other woman and had two living children by her 
CR. 64-65). 
At the time the child was conceived in October 
1954, Winifred was not married CR. 84, 94). She 
denies having sexual relations with plaintiff at this 
time CR. 99). She states that the natural father of 
the child is· an American soldier in whose home she 
was living and working at the time CR. 95). 
Plaintiff has denied that the child is his CR. 101, 
112). The child was born to Winifred at Peoria, 
Illinois, on June 15, 1955. She was not married to 
plaintiff or any man at that time CR. 84, 95). The 
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name given the child by Winifred was her maiden 
name, Fleischmann ( R. 17) . 
Plaintiff has never entered into a valid marriage 
with Winifred because his divorce from his first wife 
was not effective at the time he attempted to enter 
into such a marriage in Peoria, Illinois on July 23, 
1955 (R. 22). 
Plaintiff's German divorce decree is dated June 
28, 1955 (Exhibits D-3, D-4). This was after the 
child was conceived ( R. 84, 94, 66, 6 7) and after the 
birth of the child ( R. 66-6 7) . The German divorce de-
cree by its terms . did not become effective until 
November 21, 1955 (Exhibits D-4, D-8, R. 104, 106, 
1 0 7, 163, 164) . Plaintiff left his two children in 
Germany fatherless (R. 66-67) and traveled to Peoria, 
Illinois where he attempted to marry 'Yinifred on 
July 23, 1955. The date of this pretended marriage 
is not disputed. It was before the effective date of 
November 21, 1955 of the German decree, and plain-
tiff's first wife was and still is alive ( R. 186) . 
;,;, : Subsequent to this pretended marriage to 'Yini-
fred, and at the insistence and for the benefit of the 
American sponsors of these aliens ( R. 112-113), there 
was an attempt to change the name of the child by 
an Illinois statutory• proceeding. The statute in this 
.proceeding requires that there be a valid intermarry-
ing of the· applicants as a ·basis for it. (Statute cited 
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in Argument). It is upon this attempted marriage 
and statutory proceeding that the plaintiff bases his 
claim to being the legitimate father of this child. 
However, it is apparent from the evidence that plain-
tiff's real purpose in asserting any claim to the child 
is to use her as a pawn in an effort to reach the 
mother, Winifred, who had left him, and to try to get 
her to come back CR. 69, 67, 85, 86, 107, 110). 
The evidence indicates that the attempted mar-
riage of plaintiff and Winifred was a thing of con-
venience for them and their American sponsors CR. 
96, 99, 100). Their life together was turbulent. The 
evidence shows that from the time the child was a 
few weeks old, the plaintiff frequently beat her 
black and blue on the face and body and was cruel 
and abusive to her and that on occasions the neigh-
bors had to intervene CR. 73, 74, 85, 88, 91, 101, 102, 
119, 120), and once he held her under water CR. 
123). The plaintiff has neglected the child CR. 103, 
112, 118, 121). He shows great partiality to a 
younger child he knows to be his own CR. 89, 90., 91, 
119). He did not attempt to support the child CR. 84, 
85). Winifred's sister testified that plaintiff has 
beaten and neglected the child ever since she was a 
few months old ·CR. 169:...171 ) .. 
Winifred left the plaintiff in Peoria in Septem-
ber, 1957, and took the child involved herein to Salt 
Lake City on September 3, 1957 (R. ·108). She left 
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a younger child, Eliza beth, in the care of some friends 
in Peoria CR. 67). 
On September 29, 1957, Winifred placed the 
child with defendants in Salt Lake City CR. 108). 
This was after Winifred had notified plaintiff that 
she was placing the child for adoption CR. 81 ) . On 
October 23, 1957, after consulting with her own inde-
pendent legal counsel CR. 19, 81), Winifred executed 
an affidavit affirming that she had voluntarily de-
livered the child to the defendants on September 29, 
195 7, for the purpose of adoption, relinquished her 
rights to the child and consented that she could be 
adopted by the defendants. Further, on the hearing 
of the defendant's Petition for Adoption on October 
23, 1957, Winifred appeared in Court with her own 
independent legal counsel, testified that the plaintiff 
·was not the natural father of the child, relinquished 
her rights in the child to the defendants, and executed 
the necessary consent to adoption CR. 16-18). At that 
time the defendants also testified and executed the 
necessary consents CR. 20-21 ) . 
Pursuant to the adoption proceedings, the de-
fendants have had custody of the child in their home 
continually for nearly eighteen months since. Sep-
tember 29, 1957 CR. 128). The child \Yas sick, nerv-
ous and maladjusted upon coming into the home of 
the defendants CR. RS~ 120). Because of the defend-
ant's treatment of the child she \Yas afraid of him 
and other men CR. 80, 85, 108, 129). 
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The undisputed evidence is that the child is 
now in good health, happy, and well-adjusted CR. 
108, 110). The defendants are greatly attached and 
devoted to the child and love her as their own. They 
are people of good repute, and they have adequate 
income and facilities to maintain and care for the 
child CR. 128-133). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
I. The minor child involved herein is illegitimate. 
II. There has never been a legitimation of the child because 
there never was a valid marriage. 
Ill. Defendants have complied with the statutory requirements 
for the adoption of an illegitimafe child. 
VI. Plaintiff is not the natural father of the child. 
V. Plaintiff is not a fit and proper person to have custody of 
the child. 
VI. The best interest and welfare of the child require that the 
defendants retain custody of the child. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
The Minor Child Involved Herein Is Illegitimate. 
It is undisputed that the natural mother was 
unwed at the time the child was conceived and at the 
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birth of the child. Further, it is undisputed that the 
plaintiff was married to another woman at the time 
the child was conceived and hom. 
Point II. 
There Has Never Been a Legitimation of the 
Child Because There Was Never a Valid Marriage. 
Any possible legitimation of the child required 
a valid intermarrying of plaintiff and the natural 
mother. The above facts and the argument below 
show that plaintiff has never entered into valid mar-
riage with the mother of the child. 
If any legitimation of the child occurred, it 
would had to have been in Illinois where the plaintiff 
and natural mother and child resided and where the 
plaintiff still resides. Plaintiff relies upon the follow-
ing Illinois statute: 
"An illegitimate child whose parents 
intermarry who is acknowledged by the father 
as the father's child shall be considered legiti-
mate." (Ch. 3, Sec. 163, Ill. Ann. Statutes) 
This statute presupposes that the intermarrying 
persons be the natural parents of the child. The 
evidence in this case is that the plaintiff is not even 
the natural father of the child as \Yill be discussed 
be~ow,, and, therefor~, this statute is not applicable. 
The Illinois court has,tHf fact., ruled on its earlier 
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statute containing almost identical language that the 
establishment· of parenthood under such a legitima-
tion statute is a prerequisite. This· question is dis-
cussed in the case of Miller vs. Pennington, 218 Ill. 
220, 73 NE 919. The statute involved there was as 
follows: 
"An illegitimate child whose parents have 
intermarried· and whose fath~r has acknowl-
edged him or her as his child, shall be con-
sidered legitimate." 
The Court said in that case that in order to show 
legitimacy under that satute: 
"It was necessary for them to establish 
by the proof, three facts: 
( 1) (That the persons seeking legitima-
mation) were the parents, 
(2) That the said parents intermarried, 
and 
( 3) That 'the father' acknowledged 
them as his children." 
A similar rule under a similar stat~te was.announced 
in the California case, in re F~oods Estate, 21 P. 2d 
579, 217 Calif. 763, and is set forth at page 59, 10 
C.J.S., Bastards, Section 11 (b) as follows: 
"In order to establish a claim of adoption 
and legitimation, under the statutes described 
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above, claimant has the burden to prove (all) 
the essential elements of adoption and legiti-
mation." 
It is stated at page 68 of Section 12, 10 C.J.S., 
Bastards, that: 
"In general, the party who sets up the 
claim of legitimation by the intermarriage of 
the alleged parents of an illegitimate child has 
the burden to prove the existence of the essen-
tial elements of legitimation, as, for example, 
the alleged father's paternity of such person, 
the subsequent intermarriage of the parents, 
and recognition or acknowledgement by the 
alleged father." 
Further, any attempted legitimation of the child 
under the Illinois statute relied upon by the plaintiff 
would be defective because there never was a valid 
intermarrying between plaintiff and the natural 
mother. The rule in this regard is stated in 7 Am. 
Jur.-Bastards, Section 58, page 666: 
"A statute providing that a child born be-
fore wedlock shall be made legitimate by the 
subsequent marriage of its parents presupposes 
a valid marriage, and it does not apply to a 
child whose father had not, at the time of the 
marriage, obtained a valid divorce from his 
former wife." 
In the case of Olmsted vs. Oln1sted, 190 N.Y. 458, 83 
NE 569, affirmed in 216 U.S. 386, 5+ L. Ed. 530, 30 S. 
10 
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Ct. 292 pertaining to legitimation under a statute 
similar to the one involved here, it was held: 
"The statute relates only to such marriage 
between parents as may be lawfully made, 
and not to those which are polygamous, in-
cestuous, or prohibited by law." 
(A) The Plaintiff Was Not Divorced From His 
First Wife at the Time He Attempted to 
Marry the Natural Mother. 
The terms of the German divorce obtained by 
plaintiff's first wife while plaintiff was still in 
Germany, provided that it was not to become effective 
until November 21, 1955. Therefore, plaintiff was 
under a legal disability to enter into a valid marriage 
with the natural mother on July 23, 1955. 
The German divorce was heard June 21, 1955. 
The decree is dated June 28, 1955, and contains the 
following provision which was stipulated as being 
a correct translation from the certified copy: 
"II. It is hereby certified that the above 
Decree becomes legally effective as of Novem-
ber 21, 1955." 
It was stipulated that the German Statutes 
referred to in the German Consul's letter of February 
24, 1958 (Exhibit D-8) could be accepted as evidence 
of what the pertinent German law was at the time 
of the German decree and that the English transla-
11 
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tion set out in the same letter is correct. The English 
translation of these pertinent statutes as contained 
in this letter is as follows: 
"#5 Nobody may enter into a marriage 
before his previous marriage has been nulli-
fied or dissolved." 
"# 20 A marriage is void if one of the 
spouses was legally married to a third person 
at the time of the marriage contract." 
"#41 The marriage is divorced by Court 
decree. The marriage is dissolved when the 
decree becomes effective." 
Construing the language of the decree in the 
light of the German statutes, the trial Court held 
that the German decree did not become effective or 
dissolve the marriage until November 21, 1955, and 
until that time, the plaintiff was not divorced and 
was under a legal disability to enter into a valid 
marriage with the natural mother at the time he 
attempted to do so on July 23, 1955. 
The result of these statutes is to postpone the 
effectiveness of the divorce until the required time 
has passed. 
Reference is also made to the stipulated evidence 
that plaintiff's' first wife is still living so that he had 
not acquirep. the 1e.gal capacity to n1arry the natural 
~nother because- of tlie de~th of his first wife. 
12 
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It is submitted that ·any presumption that might 
exist as to the validity of the second marriage is 
clearly and convincingly overcome as a matter of 
law in view of the above facts, provisions of the 
decree and statutes, and the authorities immediately 
hereafter referred to. 
(B) The Disability to Marry Created by a 
Divorce is Determined by the law of the 
Jurisdiction of the Divorce and Follows the 
Person. 
It is the universal rule that where a statute, by 
its express terms or by interpretation, provides that 
it postpones the effectiveness of the divorce during 
the interlocutory period, the plaintiff is under a 
legal disability to enter into another valid marriage 
during such period, and this disability attaches and 
follows the person wherever he may go. The rule 
in this regard is set forth in 32 A.L.R. page 1125 in 
which a leading case, Heflinger us. Heflinger, 136, 
Va. 289, 118 SE 316, 32 A.L.R. 1088 is referred to 
and the rule is stated as follows: 
. "If the effect of the proVIsion of the 
statute or the decree of divorce is to postpone 
the dissolution of the former marriage until 
the lapse of the prescribed period, it is clear 
that a ;remarriage within that period will not 
be. recognized or given effect in the state 
where the decree was granted, or, . for that 
matter, in any other state, since, ex hypothesi, 
one of the ·parties at the time of remarriage 
13 
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had not the status of an unmarried person. 
In Heflinger vs. Heflinger, the Court holds 
that a provision of the statute to that effect 
is part of the decree and within the full faith 
and credit provision of the Federal Con-
stitution." 
The rule in regard to the force and effect of an 
interlocutory judgment or decree of divorce is stated 
in Section 474, Page 579 of Vol. 17 Am. Jur. Divorce 
and Separation 
"An interlocutory judgment or decree of 
divorce does not sever the matrimonial bonds; 
only a final decree or judgment is effectual 
to dissolve the marriage and restore the 
spouses to the status of single persons and to 
render each competent to marry again. After 
an interlocutory decree and until the entry of 
a final decree, the marital relation continues 
as before, with the rights incident thereto. 
Marriage after the entry of a decree nisi and 
before final decree is therefore null and void. 
notwithstanding it is contracted in another 
state." 
The same rule is found in Goodrich on Conflicts 
of Law, Hornbook Series. 2d Edition, Pages 30 7 and 
308 which reads as follovvs: 
"Under the divorce practice in some jur- , 
isdictions, an absolute decree is not first .: 
entered, but merely an interlocutory order or ~ 
decree nisi. \Yhich is made absolute at some 1 
later date, if in the meantime the Court has 
1+ 
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not become convinced that a divorce should 
not be granted. Until this decree is made final, 
the parties are not divorced; a second mar-
riage is bigamous, because the first one still 
exists.'' 
All of the Utah cases that have considered the 
force and effect of an interlocutory decree have held 
that the marriage relationship continues to exist 
until the expiration of the interim period. Johnson 
vs. Johnson, 207 P. 2d 1036; Sanders vs. Industrial 
Commission, 64 Utah 372, 230 P. 1026; Hendrich vs. 
Anderson, 191 F. 2d 242; Anderson vs. Anderson, 121 
Utah 237, 240 P. 2d 966. 
The following statement is contained In the 
Hendrich case: 
"Where interlocutory divorce decree was 
entered in wife's divorce action and decree 
provided divorce should not become final and 
absolute until expiration of six months from 
date thereof, status of husband and wife 
between parties continued until six months 
period has elapsed." 
The Illinois courts hold that a marriage en-
tered into during an interlocutory period of a divorce 
is absolutely void. Illinois does not now have a 
waiting or an interlocutory period for divorce. 
However, its rule in regard to this is clearly set forth 
in the cas·e of Stevens vs. Stevens, 304 Ill. 297, 136 
NE 785. Further, the Illinois law and attitude re-
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
garding prohibited marriages is contained in an 
express statute. Ch. 89, Sec. 19, Ill. Ann. Stat., which 
provides that prohibited marriages are void even if 
the parties attempt to circumvent the prohibition by 
going out of the state. 
The language of this Illinois statute is as follows: 
"If any person residing and intending to 
continue to reside in the state and who is dis-
a bled or prohibited from contracting marriage 
under the laws of this state shall go into 
another state or country and there contract 
a marriage prohibited and declared void by 
the laws of this state, such marriage shall be 
null and void for all purposes in this state 
with the same effect as though such prohibited 
marriage had been entered into in this state." 
Plaintiff's brief contains some statements and 
cases regarding the lack of extraterritorial effect of 
prohibitions against marriage in divorce decrees. All 
of these cases can be distinguished from the author-
ities cited by the defendants herein. In all cases 
cited by the plaintiff, in support of this proposition, 
they deal with statutes which provide or have been 
interpreted to mean. that they do not postpone the 
effectiveness of the divorce decree but merely pro-
hibit a marriage within a stipulated time and makes 
such actions subject to penalty. The cases cited by 
plaintiff do not deal with divorce statutes which 
expressly defer or have been interpreted to defer 
the severance of the marriage relationship until the 
expiration of the interim period. 
16 
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A fair reading and interpretation of the above 
referred to German statutes and the provisions of 
the German divorce decree clearly puts the decree 
and the German statutes in this latter category 
which suspend the operation of the divorce until the 
time has elapsed. Both plaintiff and defendant refer 
to and rely on cases cited in 32 A.L~R. beginning at 
1116 and 51 A.L.R. 325. However, all these cases can 
be distinguished. Where the statutes involved in 
these cases expressly or by interpretation suspend 
the operation of the divorce and continue the mar-
riage until the expiration of the intervening period, 
the status created thereby is given extraterritorial 
effect. In those cases which involve statutes which 
provide or have been interpreted to mean that the 
marriage is severed at the time of divorce and that 
the intervening period is a mere prohibition against 
remarriage, the cases generally refuse to give such 
prohibition extraterritorial effect. However, in many 
of these latter type cases, some courts grant extra-
territorial effect to such prohibition. 
The Restatement of the Law of Conflicts, ex-
pressly distinguishes between the laws which provide 
for an immediate final divorce but ·attach a period 
prohibiting remarriage and the laws which extend 
the marriage from the date of entry of the decree 
until the lapse of a stipulated time. The rule in this 
regard is· stated atpage 194 in Comment (a) under 
Section 130 in the Restatement as follows: 
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"Provisional decree distinguished. A dis-
tinction is to be noted between this case and 
a case where a divorce is, by the law goveming 
it, provisional only until the lapse of a certain 
time, or the common case of a decree nisi, or 
the so-called interlocutory decree, which does 
not become absolute until further proceedings 
or after the lapse of a certain time. In such a 
case, neither party ceases to be married until 
the lapse of the given time, and neither can 
marry again in any state, since such marriage 
would be bigamous." 
The plaintiff emphasizes the Colorado case of 
Bauer vs. Abrahams, 73 Colo. 509, 216 P. 259. In that 
case, the Colorado Court was merely called upon to 
review two conflicting Kansas statutes and determine 
that the interlocutory period of a Kansas statute 
was a mere prohibition against remarriage during 
the period and was not entitled to extraterritorial 
effect. 
A close examination of the other cases reviewed 
by the plaintiff will indicate that they can be sim-
ilarly distinguished, and they do not change the 
rule that whenever the statutory provisions provide 
or are interpreted to mean that they~ postpone the 
dissolution of the marriage ties until the specified 
time has elapsed, the Courts are uniform in stating 
that the lack of legal capacity to remarry because 
of an existing marriage during such period is given 
extraterritorial effect. 
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(C) The Validity of a Marriage or a Legitima-
tion Depends Upon the Capacity of the 
Actor and Not Alone Upon His Outward 
Acts. 
The plaintiff makes much of the argument that 
a marriage or legitimation must be determined by 
the law of the domiciliary state. Defendants are 
willing to concede, for the sake of plaintiff's argu-
ment, that generally the validity of a marriage or 
a legitimation is to be decided by the law of the 
place where they occur. In this case, the laws of 
Illinois would apply. 
However, the Illinois law can only be used and 
applied in keeping with the facts. and the status in 
relation to persons as they are found to exist at the 
time. Plaintiff will agree, that the mere performance 
of acts in outward compliance with statutes will not 
accomplish a marriage if the parties so acting are un-
der a legal disability or have no legal capacity to so 
act. Particularly is this true if in the jurisdiction 
where an act is attempted, the question of legal 
capacity has never been raised or determined. 
At the time plaintiff attempted to marry in 
Illinois, his legal status or capacity to marry was 
not raised, and the mere fact that he went through 
the procedures of marriage and legitimation based 
upon such marriage, did not clothe him with the 
capacity to do so and thereby make such acts valid. 
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Certainly the laws of Illinois would not sanction or 
treat as valid a marriage where one of the parties 
was already married just because the parties went 
through the required procedure. 
It is amply demonstrated by the cases and law 
referred to above, that the crux of our problem is to 
determine the legal status or capacity to marry that 
may or may not have been created by a divorce 
decree of another jurisdiction. To do this, vve must 
look to the divorce laws of that jurisdiction. This 
was done by the trial court as set forth in Point I 
(A) above. 
(D) The United States Courts Recognize 
Decrees of Foreign Countries. 
The divorce decree of a foreign country and the 
status there by created should be recognized by the 
courts of the United States. The rule in this regard 
is set forth in Section 959, Page 141 of Yol. 17 (a) 
Am. Jur.- Divorce and Separation: 
"Judgments of courts of foreign countries 
are recognized in the United States because 
of the comity due from one nation to another, 
its courts and judgments. Such recognition 
is granted to foreign judgments with due 
regard to international duty and convenience, 
on the one hand and to rights of citizens of 
the United States and others under the pro-
tection of its laws, on the other hand. This 
rule is frequently applied in divorce cases; a 
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decree of divorce, granted in one country by 
a court having jurisdiction to do so, will be 
given full force and effect in another country 
by comity, not only as a decree determining 
status, but also with respect to an award of 
alimony and child support." 
(E) The Capacity of Persons to Marry is 
Determined as of the Date of the 
Ceremony. 
At the time plaintiff attempted to marry the 
natural mother, the plainttiff had no legal capacity 
to do so. Further the expiration of the disabling 
period did not thereafter make the marriage valid. 
The right of persons to marry is determined as of 
the date of the ceremony. The rule in this regard 
is stated in Sec. 182 (a) Page 841 of Vol. 27 C.J.S.-
Divorce, as follows: 
"Remarriage prior to the date on which 
the prohibition of the statute or decree ter-
minates is not subsequently validated by 
removal of the legal barrier since the right 
to marry is determined as of the date of the 
ceremony." 
Further, in the Utah case of Hendrich vs. 
Anderson, 191 F. 2d 242, it is stated as follows: 
"Where interlocutory divorce decree was 
·entered in wife's divorce action, and decree 
provided divorce should not become final and 
ab~olute until expiration. of six months from 
date thereof, ~nd defendant husband attempt-
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ed to marry another woman in sister state 
before expiration of the six months period, 
fact that defendant husband and such other 
woman continued to live together as man and 
wife after expiration of six months period did 
not validate attempted marriage, since such 
marriage was void ab initio." 
"A relationship meretricious in its incep-
tion is presumed to continue so and burden 
of proving a subsequent marriage rests on 
party asserting it." 
(F) Child Is Not Issue of An Attempted 
Marriage. 
Plaintiff claims that the child is legitimate by 
reason of the provisions of Chapter 89, Sec. 17a 
Ill. Ann. Stat. which provides: 
"Whenever persons attempt or have at-
tempted to contract and be joined in marriage, 
and some form of marriage ceremony recog-
nized by law has been performed in apparent 
compliance with the law in relation to 
marriage, and pursuant to such attempt to 
contract and be joined in marriage, cohabit 
or have cohabited together as husband and 
wife, and there is issue born after the taking 
effect of this Act, as a result of such cohab-
itation, such issue is hereby made legitimate 
and may take the name of the father~ though 
such attempted marriage is declared void or 
might be declared void, for any reason." 
Here again, the uncontroverted facts of this case 
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do not bring it within the purview of this statute. 
The application of the statute is fatally defective 
because to come within the provis~ons of it, the 
parents must have cohabited in pursuance of a void 
or voidable marriage and the child must have been 
born issue as a result of such cohabitation. Since 
the child herein was born before there was any 
attempted marriage, she could not have been the 
issue of any cohabitation pursuant to an attempted 
marriage as is required by the statutes. 
POINT III. 
Defendants Have Complied with the Statutory 
Requirements for the Adoption of an Illegitimate Child. 
Under Chapter 30 of Title 78, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, no notice is required to be given to 
the natural father in the case of an adoption of an 
illegitimate child. 
The record shows that the defendants have 
fully complied with the provisions of Chapter 30 
pertaining to the adoption of an illegitimate child 
and the plaintiff has not attempted to show other-
wise in the proceedings below or in connection with 
the appeal herein. 
POINT IV. 
Plaintiff. is Not the Natural Father of the· Chitd. 
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It is submitted that where as here, there is a 
child conceived and born out of wedlock of question-
able patemity, the restrictive rule of evidence that 
the mother may not testify directly as to non-access 
does not apply. Counsel has spent many hours trying 
to find an authority or a case that discusses whether 
this rule should be applied in such a proceeding to 
determine the patemity of an admittedly illegiti-
mate child, and he has been unable to find such 
a case. 
Since in a situation such as we have here, the 
child is admittedly illegitimate, the reason given 
for the rule disappears. In fact, \Vigmore attacks 
the basis and value of the restrictive rule in any 
situation. In Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed. Vol. VII. 
Sec. 2063, he traces the devious development of this 
present rule and characterizes it as "Lord Mansfield's 
dogmatic pronouncement." He states that the rule 
~'may have become, in some jurisdictions, too deeply 
planted to be uprooted" but sets forth: 
"It is agreed, however~ on all hands, that 
the prohibited testimony concerns solely the 
specific fact of non-access, i.e., testimony to 
any other fact constituting illegitimacy or to 
illegitimacy in general is admissible." 
In this same authority (Wigmore) at Sec. 133, 
Vol. I, it is stated: 
"On this principle it is permissible to 
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show, in a filiation or bastardy prosecution, 
that the mother had intercourse with another 
man about the time designated as the period 
of gestation, for this predicates an equal pos-
sibility of conception through someone else's 
act." 
Utah follows the rule "that in a bastardy pro-
ceeding, intercourse with others than the defendant 
within the period of gestation may be shown." 
State vs. Hammond, 46 Utah 249, 148 P. 420. 
Defendants contend, therefore, that in determ-
ining the paternity of an admittedly illegitimate 
child as is the case before the Court, the restrictive 
rule that a mother cannot testify directly as to non-
. access does not apply, and the Court should be free 
to consider any competent evidence that would have 
a bearing on the paternity of the child. However, 
if it is deemed that the restrictive rule should apply, 
there is certainly sufficient other testimony and acts 
of the natural mother and of the plaintiff to support 
a finding that the plaintiff is not the natural father. 
POINT V. 
Plaintiff Is Not a Fit and Proper Person To Have 
Custody of the Child. 
The record 'of this case is replete with evidence 
reflecting adversely upon the fitnes~ of the plaintiff 
·to :have -custody of . this three .and one-half year-old 
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female child. He cared so little for his first wife and 
family that while he was still married, he carried 
on an illicit relation with a seventeen-year-old girl. 
He apparently has no affection for children as is 
shown by his leaving his two small children in 
Germany fatherless. It is submitted that any man 
who would beat a child black and blue while of 
the tender age of a few weeks for any reason is not 
a fit person. The reasons given by the plaintiff for 
such actions are that the child would cry or would 
not go to sleep. The plaintiff admits that on one 
occasion he struck the small girl to an extent suffi-
cient to bruise her, and admits that at least on one 
occasion the neighbors intervened in the course of 
his beating the child. The natural mother and her 
sister testified to many occasions upon which the 
plaintiff beat the child black and blue, and on one 
occasion, beat her in the face. On several occasions 
the neighbors intervened when plaintiff \Yas abusing 
the child. 
The plaintiff frequently left the infant child 
alone and unattended. He showed great partiality 
toward a younger child \Yhich he kne\Y to be his 
own. The plaintiff allowed the mother to take the 
child involved herein \Yith her at the tin1e she left 
him, and the younger child \Y hich he kne\Y to be 
his, remained in Peoria, Illinois. It is apparent that 
plaintiff has no real interest in this child, and it 
was only when he became aware that the mother 
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intended not to come back to him and intended 
getting a divorce, that he has become interested in 
the child as a pawn in the hope of reaching the 
mother and persuading her to come back to him. 
Under the undisputed facts of the record, it can 
be safely concluded that the plaintiff is not a fit 
and proper person to have the custody of this child. 
POINT VI. 
The Best Interests and Welfare of the Child Require 
that the Defendants Retain Custody of Her. 
The Utah courts have always held that the 
overriding consideration in determining the custody 
of a minor child is the welfare of the child. In an 
early case, Kurtz vs. Christensen, 209 P. 340, 61 Utah 
1, it was held: 
"Even in a case where the parents of the 
child intermarried after its birth, their right 
to reclaim the child from persons to whom 
the mother had given the child shortly after 
its birth, was denied on the ground that the 
best interests of the child would be served by 
leaving it in the possession of such persons." 
The rule in regard to child custody cases such 
as the one here under consideration is well defined 
in Walton vs. Coffman, 169 P. 2d 97 a~ follows: 
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"We conclude that the determining con-
sideration in cases of this kind is: What will 
be for the best interests and welfare of the 
child? That in determining this question there 
is a presumption that it will be for the best 
interest and welfare of the child to be reared 
under the care, custody and control of its 
natural parent; that this presumption is not 
overcome unless from all of the evidence the 
trier of the facts is satisfied that the welfare 
of the child requires that it be awarded to 
someone other than its natural parent." 
In the above case, the custody of two children 
was given to the maternal grandparents rather than 
the mother. This rule has been followed in the 
subsequent cases of Baldwin vs. Nielson, 17 4 P. 2d 
437 and Briggs vs. Briggs, 181 P. 2d 223. 
In the case now under consideration, the trial 
court after seeing and hearing the ·witnesses, found 
that the best interests of the child required that it 
remain in the custody of the defendants, the adopt-
ing parents. In the Walton vs. Coffman case, the 
Court, in making its decision, reiterated the "Tell 
known rule that· in an equity case, the factual record 
is also before the appellate court for revie'Y but that 
"in so doing, we (the Court) should keep in 
·mind that the trial judge saw and heard the 
witnesses and observed their demeanor and 
was acquainted with the circumstances sm·-
rounding the giving of their testimony, and, 
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therefore, was in a better position than we are 
to weigh and evaluate their evidence." 
I : 
The mother has voluntarily and irrevocably 
relinquished the custody of the illegitimate child to 
the defendants. The trial court has found that plain-
tiff is not the natural father. The plaintiff has failed 
in one marriage and has turned his back on the 
children of that marriage. The plaintiff has failed 
in a second attempted marriage. Plaintiff shows a 
history of brutality, neglect and lack of interest in 
the child and a desire to use the child to serve his 
own ends with her mother. At best, his ability and 
capacity to care for the small girl would be make-
shift and uncertain. The life of this young child with 
the plaintiff would have all the "built in" elements 
that lead to unhappiness, heartache, maladjustment 
and disaster for the child. 
The defendants have had custody of this three 
and one-half yea:r-old child for almost a year and 
one-half by order of the Court in the adoption pro-
ceedings. She was sick, nervous and maladjusted and 
afraid of men ·when she was. placed with the de-
fendants. They have carefully and lovingly cared 
for her so that she is now happy, contented and well-
adjusted. The defendants have the ability and 
capacity to. provide· ideal c:a:re and :home for the 
child. They· are devoted and deeply attached to her 
and love her as their own. 1 } -')-· 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff 
has no legal claim to the child for the reasons set 
forth above in Points I through IV. Further, the 
best interests of the child require that the child 
remain with the defendant adopting parents for the 
reasons set forth above in Points V and VI. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully 
submitted that the Decision and Order of the Trial 
Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OWEN & V\FARD 
Counsel for the Defendants 
and Respondents, 
141 East Second South Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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